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LEVY VS. LEVY 
David A. Anderson* 
EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS. By Leonard w. Levy. New y ork: 
Oxford University Press. 1985. Pp. xxii, 383. $29.95. 
Leonard Levy is a master of the disarming preface. In his preface 
to Legacy of Suppression 1 in 1960, he depicted himself as the reluctant 
bearer of the bad news that the framers of the first amendment had no 
real appreciation of freedom of expression. His tone was less that of 
the historian presenting interpretations than that of a scientist present-
ing unwelcome but irrefutable discoveries. He said the book had been 
difficult to write, requiring him to violate his own predilections and 
put aside personal preferences. 2 He said he had tried to put himself 
"back into the 'twilight' where the past must be taken on its own 
terms."3 His approach had been to "believe nothing unless proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt."4 He said: "I do not write history from 
the standpoint of any ideological tong. Nor is it my intention to play 
the debunker who relishes smashing popular idols and myths. I would 
be delighted if this book were proven to be wrong."5 
Rereading Legacy, one notes that Levy seems to have warmed to 
the role of myth-debunker, and the ferocity with which he defended 
Legacy against those who questioned it6 might make one a bit skepti-
cal about his eagerness to see it proven wrong. But for twenty-five 
years, Levy has been viewed as the reluctant revisionist to whom fell 
the task of exploding the myth that the framers fought a Revolution , . 
and adopted the first amendment because they chenshed freedom of 
speech and press. In fact, Levy insisted, the framers had no meaning-
ful experience with freedom of expression, and understood the concept 
to mean no more than it meant to Blackstone: freedom from prior 
restraints. 
• Vinson and Elkins Professor, University of Texas School of Law. A.B. 1962, Harvard 
College; J.D. 1971, University of Texas. - Ed. 
1. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMER-
ICAN HISTORY (1960). 
2. Id. at viii. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at ix. 
5. Id. at xi. 
6. See Levy, The Legacy Reexamined, 37 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1985), which is a response to 
Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
91 (1984); Levy, On the Origins of the Free Press, 32 UCLA L. REV. 177 (1984), which is a 
response to my article, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983). 
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Emergence of a Free Press is the original revisionist's revision of 
Legacy. It could have been a work of major importance. For all his 
prickliness, Levy is still the most important first amendment historian. 
His work has stimulated and informed virtually all of the scholarship 
in the field. He has received the scholar's greatest reward: his is the 
work that all others study, challenge, and rely on. A reexamination of 
the subject by the master himself could have produced a milestone 
comparable to Legacy itself. 
The preface to the new book is promising. Levy reveals that the 
author of Legacy was not quite the dispassionate scholar he pretended 
to be. In the 1950s The Fund for the Republic had commissioned 
Levy to write a memorandum on the original understanding of the 
first amendment. His research persuaded him that the framers had a 
narrow view of freedom of political expression. The head of the Fund, 
Robert M. Hutchins, was. so displeased by this result that he declined 
to publish the portions relating to freedom of expression. Levy now 
writes: 
I was angry and decided to strike back by giving what I thought would 
be maximum publicity to the material that The Fund rejected. . . . I 
wrote Legacy of Suppression to spite Hutchins and The Fund and as a 
result of a chance opportunity to explore the subject. 
The title I chose and the rather strong theme I developed in that 
book reflected both my shock at discovering the neglected evidence and 
my indignation at Hutchins and The Fund for attempting to suppress 
my work. As a result I overdid it. I had a novel position, which I over-
stated. [pp. viii-ix] . 
This is only one of the confessions Levy makes in the new preface. 
He also confesses to many of the errors with which his critics have 
charged him over the years. He admits that: 
- he ignored evidence that press criticism of government in the 
1780s and 1790s was scorching and epidemic (p. x). 
- he was wrong when he said the early American experience with 
freedom of expression was slight (p. x). 
- "Americans respected freedom of expression far more than the-
oreticians and legalists had acknowledged before 1798" (p. xi). 
- "I gave the misleading impression that freedom of the press 
meant to the Framers merely the absence of prior restraints" (p. xi). 
- "[T]he press had achieved a special status as an unofficial fourth 
branch of government, 'the Fourth Estate,' whose function was to 
check the three official branches by exposing misdeeds and policies 
contrary to the public interest" (p. xii). 
- "[F]reedom of the press had come to mean that the system of 
popular government could not effectively operate unless the press dis-
charged its obligations to the electorate by judging officeholders and 
candidates for office" (p. xii). 
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These are remarkable concessions from a scholar who previously 
insisted that freedom of expression could only have meant freedom 
from prior restraint, since no other understanding existed. They lead 
one to expect that the revision will be a purified version of Legacy, 
retaining the healthy skepticism of the original, rejecting its excesses, 
and meeting forthrightly the arguments of its critics. But Emergence 
does not deliver what the preface promises. 
Levy's treatment of his critics, though less contentious here than in 
his law review articles, 7 is more quarrelsome than responsive. Legacy 
and Levy's subsequent writings stimulated immense amounts of 
praise, criticism, and further research. 8 The revision offered Levy an 
opportunity to reevaluate his own work in light of this new scholar-
ship. But instead of evaluating his critics' arguments, Levy lashes out 
at them, often over peripheral points or minor errors. 
Richard Buel, who argued that patriot-controlled assemblies 
largely abandoned the use of parliamentary privilege to punish print-
ers after 1760,9 is excoriated for offering no evidence, misleading read-
ers, using a "weasel word" (p. 83), and having a stunted 
understanding of freedom of speech (p. 87 n.70). Levy's answer to 
Buel's point, however, is only the doubtful proposition that the assem-
blies' failure to punish printers is irrelevant because they did punish 
others (p. 84). Levy says Buel "perverts what I said in Legacy of Sup-
pression yet freely borrows without giving credit" (p. 87 n. 70), but he 
does not indicate what Buel perverted or borrowed. Buel's major 
point, that colonial Americans viewed the press as vital to the scheme 
of representative government, is not mentioned. 
Vincent Blasi challenged the thesis of Legacy by showing that 
political thinkers of the eighteenth century viewed a free press as es-
sential to check "the inherent tendency of government officials to 
abuse the power entrusted to them."10 Levy now adopts Blasi's argu-
ment as his own (p. xii) without a hint of credit. Indeed, his only 
7. See Levy's articles cited at note 6 supra. 
8. See G. ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST (1971); w. BERNS, THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976); H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (196S); Baldasty, Toward an Understanding of the First Amendment: 
Boston Newspapers, 1782-1791, 3 JOURNALISM HIST. 2S (1976); Buel, Freedom of the Press in 
Revolutionary America: The Evolution of Libertarianism, 1760-1820, in THE PRESS AND THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Bailyn & Hench eds. 1980); Anastaplo, Book Review, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 73S (1964); Cound, Book Review, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2S3 (1961); Jensen, Book Review, 7S 
HARV. L. REV. 4S6 (1961); Storing, Book Review, SS AM. POL. SCI. REV. 38S (1961); D. Teeter, 
A Legacy of Expression: Philadelphia Newspapers and Congress During the War for Indepen-
dence, 177S-1783 (1966) (unpublished dissertation, University of Wisconsin); see also Nelson, 
Seditious Libel in Colonial America, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160 (19S9), which was published 
before Legacy. 
9. See Buel, supra note 8. 
10. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH 
J. S21, S38. 
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discussion of Blasi's work is a scurrilous assertion that Blasi manipu-
lated historical data to mislead readers (p. 259 n.106). 
Levy abuses even those to whom he acknowledges he is indebted. 
He credits Dwight Teeter with "breaking new ground" in showing the 
freedom with which the Philadelphia newspapers attacked politicians 
(p. 205 n.101). He uses Tee~er's evidence extensively, and in the 
acknowledgements he says Teeter's work helped shape the revision. 
Teeter was one of those who showed that Levy was wrong when he 
asserted that no one in America had repudiated the concept of sedi-
tious libel by the time the first amendment was ratified. 11 Levy now 
accepts Teeter's proof that "Junius Wilkes" in 1782 unmistakably re-
pudiated seditious libel (p. 208). Teeter also showed that in the same 
year Eleazar Oswald, the irrepressible Philadelphia printer, con-
demned the English doctrine of seditious libel. 12 But Levy deprecates 
Teeter's understanding of the subject (pp. 205 n.101, 290) and quibbles 
over minor errors (pp. 207 n.109, 209 n.111). 13 Levy implies that Tee-
ter misrepresented Oswald's position by failing to note that Oswald 
did not favor "unbounded Liberty" of the press (p. 207 n.105). But it 
is Levy who misleads here. Oswald's concession of the need for bound-
aries was not an endorsement of seditious libel; rather, as Teeter points 
out, Oswald drew a distinction between public and private libels, argu-
ing that the former should be legally restrained but that "a Constant 
Examination into the Characters and Conduct of Ministers and Mag-
istrates should be equally promoted and encouraged."14 
Levy suggests that Teeter "mistakenly" understood seditious libel 
as encompassing criticism of government or its measures or officials 
(p. 290). But that is Levy's own definition: "the crime consisted of 
defaming or condemning or ridiculing the government: its form, con-
stitution, officers, laws, conduct, or policies, to the jeopardy of the 
public peace" (p. 8). 
Most outrageous of all is Levy's nontreatment of Merrill Jensen, 
the historian who first pointed out Levy's obliviousness to the fact that 
the newspapers of the framers' time were full of seditious libel. 15 As 
11. See Teeter, supra note 8; see also Teeter, The Printer and the Chief Justice: Seditious 
Libel in 1782-83, 45 JOURNALISM Q. 235, 239 (1968). 
12. See Teeter, Decent Animadversions: Notes Toward a History of Free Press Theory, in 
NEWSLETIERS TO NEWSPAPERS: EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY JOURNALISM 237, 241-42 (D. Bond 
& W. McLeod eds. 1977). 
13. Teeter identified one pseudonymous contributor to Oswald's paper as "Junius Wilkes." 
It was actually a different writer, using the pen name "Wilkes," who was in turn quoting from 
"Junius." Independent Gazetteer, Oct. 19, 1782. 
14. Teeter, supra note 12, at 242. To Teeter's observation that both Oswald and Wilkes 
showed disgust with seditious libel, Levy responds that neither used that term. P. 207 n.109. 
This is hardly an answer, since Oswald referred to the concept as "the infamous English doctrine 
of Libels" and Wilkes argued that the press should be "perfectly free and unrestrained." See 
Teeter, The Printer and the Chief Justice, supra note 11, at 239. 
15. See Jensen, supra note 8, at 457. 
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Teeter has observed, Jensen's 1961 review of Legacy was "a blueprint" 
for the revision that Levy now acknowledges was needed. 16 But 
Emergence contains no mention of Jensen's review, let alone any ad-
mission that Jensen was right. Levy's attitude toward the critics whose 
work exposed the weaknesses of Legacy is revealed in his acknowl-
edgements. He says he has read them, and that a few of them even 
influenced his revision. But after recognizing a "continuing obliga-
tion" to those who assisted him in the writing of Legacy, he writes: "I 
have accumulated no comparable debts for Emergence of a Free Press. 
People who borrow their opinions from others can scarcely repay their 
debts. Fortunately I have none" (p. xxi). 
Whether it is the product of conversion or revelation, Emergence 
does repudiate at least some of the excesses of Levy's earlier work. In 
Legacy Levy tried to treat his evidence cautiously, making no claim 
that he had discovered the original understanding of the first amend-
ment. His conclusion was merely that the traditional assumption that 
the framers held a libertarian view of freedom of expression was "sub-
ject to the Scottish verdict: not proven." 17 
He was careful to point out that "[n]o one can say for certain what 
the Framers had in mind," 18 and that there may have been no real 
consensus as to what they meant by freedom of speech and press. 19 
He was aware that "much of history lies in the interstices of the evi-
dence and cannot always be mustered and measured."20 
But it was not Levy's meticulous sifting of historical evidence that 
gave the book its impact. The book was a sensation because of what 
its title implied: that our legacy from the framers was one of suppres-
sion, not freedom of expression. That point was only implied in the 
original text of Legacy but was expressed in the preface: "the genera-
tion which adopted the Constitution and the Bill of Rights did not 
believe in a broad scope for freedom of expression, particularly in the 
realm of politics."21 
The thesis itself was not new; forty years earlier Professor Corwin 
published an article in the Yale Law Journal arguing that the first 
amendment had not been intended to forbid seditious libel prosecu-
tions, that its purpose rather was to reserve the field to the states, and 
that Justice Holmes was wrong when he argued that the first amend-
ment repudiated seditious libel.22 Although Levy cited Corwin's work 
16. See Teeter, From Revisionism to Orthodoxy, 13 REVIEWS IN AM. HIST. 518, 520 (1985). 
17. L. LEVY, supra note 1, at 237. 
18. Id. at 236. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at viii. 
21. Id. at vii. 
22. Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press Under the First Amendment: A Resumi, 30 YALE 
L.J. 48 (1920). 
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in his bibliography, he did not otherwise mention it in Legacy. By 
treating his findings as discoveries rather than affirmations of a theory 
previously advanced, and by repeatedly professing his dislike of the 
revisionist's role, Levy encouraged readers to believe the book con-
tained some important repudiation of previous wisdom. 
In his own subsequent writings, Levy seemed to forget his own 
reservations. Two years after Legacy appeared, he wrote an article for 
the American Historical Review in which he asserted flatly that the first 
amendment did not repudiate "the Blackstonian concept that freedom 
of the press meant merely freedom from prior restraint,"23 and that 
Blackstone's definition was universally accepted in America.24 "No 
other definition of freedom of the press by anyone anywhere in 
America before 1798 has been discovered," he claimed.25 
A year later he wrote a new preface for a paperback edition of 
Legacy. 26 He rejected suggestions that he had underestimated the ex-
tent and vitality of newspaper criticism of government in the colonial 
and early national period.27 He ridiculed the critics who had made 
this point, equating their argument with "the proposition that the 
existence of so many heretics during the reign of Bloody Mary proves 
that there was a great degree of freedom of religion, despite the fires at 
Smithfield .... "28 He found it unnecessary to modify any of Legacy's 
"principal theses," which by then had grown to six: 
that the First Amendment was not intended to supersede the common 
law of seditious libel, that the legislatures rather than the courts were the 
chief suppressive agencies, that the theory of freedom of speech in polit-
ical matters was quite narrow until 1798, that English libertarian theory 
was in the vanguard of the American, that the Bill of Rights was in large 
measure a lucky political accident, and that the First Amendment was 
more an expression of federalism than of libertarianism. 29 
It was in 1966, however, that Levy's thesis reached full flower. 
Levy wrote a sixty-page introduction to an anthology of original 
source materials. 30 The original thesis of Legacy had been essentially 
negative: that the framers did not intend to abolish seditious libel. As 
to what they did intend, Legacy offered little beyond the suggestion 
that the Blackstonian proscription of prior restraints was the only 
widely accepted definition of freedom of the press. In the 1966 essay, 
however, Levy developed two affirmative corollaries of the original 
23. Levy, Liberty and the First Amendment: 1790-1800, 68 AM. H1sr. REV. 22, 22 (1962). 
24. Id. at 26. 
25~ Id. at 27. 
26. L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY 
OF SUPPRESSION (Torchbook ed. 1963). 
27. Id. at ix-xi. 
28. Id. at xi. 
29. Id. at ix. 
30. L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON (1966). 
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thesis. One was that the first amendment was intended not merely to 
prohibit prior restraints, but to "prohibit any Congressional regulation 
of the press, whether by means of a licensing act, a tax act, or a sedi-
tion act. The framers meant Congress to be totally without power to 
enact legislation respecting the press."31 The second- now described 
by Levy as the primary purpose of the first amendment - "was to 
reserve to the states an exclusive authority, as far as legislation was 
concerned, in the field of speech and press."32 The Levy thesis had 
grown far beyond the modest conclusions contained in the text of Leg-
acy itself. 
In the new book, Levy is forced to abandon most of the post-Leg-
acy embellishments. He repeats the two affirmative corollaries from 
the 1966 essay (pp. 268-70),33 but what he identifies as the "principal 
thesis" (p. xii) of the new book is the original Scottish verdict: that 
history does not support the view that the first amendment was in-
tended to abolish the common law of seditious libel. 
Levy still wants to extrapolate, however, from this modest proposi-
tion to the larger idea that the framers did not intend to guarantee a 
truly free press. In Legacy, the argument was that the press clause 
must have been intended only to prohibit prior restraints because no 
broader understanding was available when it was framed. But now 
Levy is forced to recognize that broader understandings were available 
- for example, that the framers realized popular government could 
not operate successfully unless the press was free to criticize office-
holders and candidates (p. xii). 
So Emergence shifts to a slightly different argument: freedom of 
the press may have meant more than freedom from prior restraint, but 
it still was not a libertarian concept because it failed to repudiate sedi-
tious libel. Even if seditious libels were rarely prosecuted, and even if 
the Americans believed the harsh English doctrine should be reformed 
to make truth a defense and allow the jury to return a general verdict, 
the continued existence of seditious libel "implied an extremely nar-
row concept of freedom of the press" (p. 203). He argues that no 
broad libertarian theory was possible "until Americans understood the 
incompatibility between seditious libel and free government" (p. 121). 
David Rabban has shown the fallacy of using seditious libel as the 
31. Id. at lvi-lvii. 
32. Id. at lix. 
33. Levy is forced to concede that his first corollary is inconsistent with the language of the 
first amendment. If the framers really intended to prohibit Congress from making any law re-
specting the press, they knew how to say so, as the establishment clause shows: "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... " Instead, the first amendment only 
prohibited Congress from abridging the freedom of the press. Levy concedes that "[t]he verbs in 
its various clauses, if taken seriously, pose insurmountable problems" for his proposition. But he 
dismisses them as merely "ineptness" of phrasing. P. 270. 
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measure of the framers' libertarianism. 34 Fifty years earlier, the 
Zenger case35 had convinced Americans that the doctrine should be 
modified to make truth a defense and allow juries to decide whether 
the utterance was seditious. Though not incorporated into the law, 
these reforms were so widely embraced that by the time of the framers' 
generation seditious libel had ceased to be an effective deterrent to a 
free press. That it was later resurrected and enthusiastically enforced 
under the Sedition Act, and that the Zengerian reforms then proved to 
be inadequate, is no proof that the framers did not have libertarian 
intentions.36 New ideas about popular sovereignty and republican 
government, derived from the Radical Whig movement in England, 
were far more important than the inherited law of seditious libel in 
shaping the framers' concept of freedom of the press. 37 
Levy's new title makes the fallacy all the more glaring. If the book 
were really the history of the emergence of a free press, presumably it 
would tell us when that occurred. But by Levy's standard, the press 
cannot be free until seditious libel has been repudiated. It is not 
enough that the doctrine is ignored, and that the press behaves as if 
the law doesn't exist; the concept must be wiped from the books. If 
one accepts Levy's insistence that we look at law rather than practice, 
one might conclude that there is no meaningful freedom of the press in 
the United States today. The Supreme Court was given an opportu-
nity in 1965 to declare seditious libel unconstitutional, but it failed to 
do so. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 38 a local district attorney was con-
victed of criminal defamation for accusing certain judges of ineffi-
ciency and laziness, and of thwarting aggressive prosecutions of vice. 
Levy might insist that this is "criminal libel," rather than seditious 
libel,39 but the distinction is specious. The statements for which Gar-
rison was sentenced to four months in jail or a $1,000 fine40 were pre-
cisely the kind of statements that were prosecuted at common law as 
seditious libels. In the Supreme Court, Garrison squarely argued that 
it was a seditious libel case and that seditious libel prosecutions were 
forbidden by the first amendment.41 The Court did not accept the ar-
gument. Instead, it held that the conviction could not stand because 
34. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early 
American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 809 (1985) (reviewing L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A 
FREE PRESS (1985)). 
35. The classic report of the case is J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND 
TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (S. Katz ed. 1963). 
36. See Rabban, supra note 34, at 809-10. 
37. Id. at 823-32. 
38. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
39. He asserts that "criminal libel was a redundant subcategory of the broad offense of crimi-
nal libel," of which seditious libel was another subcategory. Pp. 7-8. 
40. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 9, Garrison. 
41. Brief for Appellant at 12-28, Garrison. In the first sentence of his concurring opinion, 
Justice Douglas referred to "this prosecution for a seditious libel." 379 U.S. at 80. 
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the state had not shown that Garrison spoke with actual malice - the 
same standard the court had adopted a year earlier for civil libel suits 
by public officials. 42 
In practice, of course, such prosecutions have disappeared, and one 
might hope that if the Court meant what it said in New York Times v. 
Sullivan43 - that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional - it would 
reverse a seditious libel conviction even if actual malice were shown. 
In any event, the existence of seditious libel on the books no more 
proves that the press is not free than does the Supreme Court's refusal 
to rule out all prior restraints.44 But one who adopts Levy's archeo-
logical approach to legal history, focusing on artifacts rather than 
practice, must conclude that since the doctrine of seditious libel was 
not "repudiated" by Garrison, it still exists and the press therefore is 
not free today. 
In the end, Levy is unable to decide how much of Legacy to repu-
diate. The result is a puzzle of inconsistencies. As Rabban has ob-
served, the inconsistencies make it difficult "to determine how much 
he has really changed his mind."45 One of Levy's key confessions in 
his new preface is that he was wrong when he said Americans had 
slight experience with freedom of expression before 1798: "From a far 
more thorough reading of American newspapers of the eighteenth cen-
tury I now know that the American experience with a free press was as 
broad as the theoretical inheritance was narrow" (p. x). But in the 
text, he still insists that "during the entire colonial period, from the 
time of the first settlements to the outbreak of the Revolution and the 
framing of the first bills of rights, America had had slight experience 
with freedom of speech or press as a meaningful condition of life" (p. 
86). 
Even in those passages where he r:ecognizes that the press of the 
framers' generation behaved as if it were free, he seems unable to de-
cide whether this is relevant to the intended meaning of the first 
amendment. On the one hand, he insists that "the rarity of prosecu-
tions for seditious libel, and the existence of an unfettered press do not 
illumine the scope and meaning of freedom of the press or the law on 
freedom of the press" (p. xvi). He explains: 
I refuse to prove the existence of unfettered press practices by giving il-
lustrations of savage press criticisms of government policies or vicious 
character assassinations of American politicians. I am not intent on 
measuring the degree of freedom that Americans enjoyed. I am inter-
42. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
43. 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). 
44. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Nebraska Press Assn. v. 
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
45. Rabban, supra note 34, at 809. 
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ested, to use an analogy, in defining the concept of crime, and therefore 
do not find crime rate statistics to be helpful. [p. xv] 
Adhering to this belief that theory is more important than practice,46 
he devotes most of the book to proving that seditious libel had not 
been repudiated by the time the first amendment was ratified. He re-
tains Legacy's conclusion that the first amendment probably was in-
tended to leave the law of seditious libel in force and embody the 
Blackstonian definition of freedom of the press, i.e., nothing more than 
freedom from prior restraints (p. 281).47 But he also reaches a new 
conclusion: 
When the framers of the First Amendment provided that Congress 
shall not abridge the freedom of the press they could only have meant to 
protect the press with which they were familiar and as it operated at the 
time. They constitutionally guaranteed the practice of freedom of the 
press. They did not adopt its legal definition as found in Blackstone or in 
the views of libertarian theorists. By freedom of the press the Framers 
meant a right to engage in rasping, corrosive, and offensive discussions 
on all topics of public interest .... [p. 272 (emphasis in original)] 
If he means - contrary to his thesis in Legacy - that the framers 
intended something more than Blackstone's freedom from prior re-
straint but something less than freedom from seditious libel, he should 
say so. To conclude that they intended to preserve seditious libel and 
Blackstone, and that they also intended to reject Blackstone and pre-
serve the seditious press with which they were familiar, is not revision 
but confusion. 
46. When the practice-over-theory argument serves his ends, however, Levy uses it. He cites 
the existence of widespread mob violence - which of course was illegal - against Tory printers 
to show that Americans had only an extraordinarily narrow concept of freedom of expression. P. 
85. 
47. In Legacy, L. LEVY, supra note 1, this conclusion appears at pp. 247-48. Levy at one 
point asserts that when he refers to Blackstone's view he does not mean merely freedom from 
prior restraints. P. xi. But that is precisely what Blackstone meant: "The liberty of the press ••. 
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for 
criminal matter when published." 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52 (emphasis in 
original). Elsewhere Levy acknowledges that "[t]he common law's definition of freedom of the 
press meant merely the absence of censorship in advance of publication." P. 13. 
